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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution to the economic theory of tax compliance of Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) a number of apparent failings of the standard portfolio model
have been identied. First, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, the standard
portfolio model predicts that the level of tax evasion is a decreasing function of
the tax rate (Yitzhaki 1974). As well as being counterintuitive, this prediction is
contradicted by the balance of the empirical evidence: while support is o¤ered by
Feinstein (1991) and Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995), the opposite nding is
reported by the majority of studies (e.g. Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg 1978;
Clotfelter 1983; Slemrod 1985; Crane and Nourzad 1986). Thus, while it seems there
may be circumstances in which the prediction of the standard model holds true, the
evidence suggests that the relationship between evasion and the marginal tax rate is
more normally observed to be positive than negative.
Second, a wide range of research - including experiments (Spicer and Becker 1980;
Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking 1987; Kim 2002), attitudinal surveys (Spicer and Lund-
stedt 1976; Citrin 1979; Wallschutzky 1984; Scholz and Lubell 1998), and empirical
studies (e.g. Alm, Bahl, and Murray 1990) - argues that public expenditure a¤ects tax
compliance.1 Specically, adverse discrepancies between tax payments and the per-
ceived value of public expenditures are found to be positively related to tax evasion.
However, when Cowell and Gordon (1988) extend the standard portfolio model by
adding a government nanced public good, their principal comparative static result
implies exactly the opposite of the empirical evidence: individual evasion is decreasing
(increasing) in the tax rate when the public good is over-provided (under-provided).
Falkinger (1988) nds the same perverse result in a similar model. Subsequent au-
thors have felt the need to distinguish between the exchange-equityand economic
explanations of the role of public expenditures on tax compliance, the two being
irreconcilable.
Third, when extended to allow for obligatory advanced tax payments, the portfolio
model predicts that such payments have no e¤ect on compliance. However, both
empirical and experimental studies show that evasion is decreasing in the amount of
refund that taxpayers expect to receive upon the ling of a tax return, and increasing
in the amount of taxes they still have to pay (Chang and Schultz 1990; Robben et al.
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1990).
These three shortcomings appear to question the reasonableness of representing the
taxpayer as a risk-averse agent gambling over levels of net consumption. Alternatively,
a substantial literature spanning economics and psychology - reviewed in Kahneman
and Tversky (2000) - proposes that individuals judge outcomes relative to a reference
level.2
The dominant reference-dependent model of choice under risk is (cumulative) prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). As applied to
tax compliance, prospect theory supposes, rst, that taxpayers are risk averse over
outcomes that fall above the reference level of net consumption, but risk seeking over
outcomes that fall below the reference level (diminishing sensitivity). Second, utility
is steeper over consumption below the reference level than it is above, so outcomes
below the reference level are more painful than the corresponding outcomes above the
reference level are satisfying (loss aversion). Third, taxpayers psychologically over-
weight low probabilities but underweight high probabilities (probability weighting).
For an arbitrary exogenous reference level, Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) show that
replacing expected utility theory with prospect theory in the standard portfolio model
can reverse Yitzhakis negative relationship between the tax rate and evasion. Fur-
thermore, prospect theory can o¤er an account of the advanced payment e¤ect (see
Schepanski and Shearer 1995; Yaniv 1999).3
Given the evidence that public expenditure can inuence tax compliance, it seems
unlikely that the reference level employed by the taxpayer is simply exogenous as in
Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004). Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) allow the reference
level to be endogenously determined as the taxpayers legal level of net consump-
tion. However, this specication remains independent of public expenditure and the
compliance behavior of other taxpayers.
In this paper I propose a model in which the reference level reects a concern for
exchange equity between taxpayers and government, thereby capturing both the role
of public good provision and the behavior of other taxpayers. My notion of exchange
equity is specic to each taxpayer, measuring the balance between a taxpayers valu-
ation of the public goods provided by government, and the value of taxes paid.
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With this approach I am able to overturn Cowell and Gordons result on the rela-
tionship between tax rates and evasion in the presence of public expenditures in a
direction consistent with the empirical evidence. Also, I am able to analyze the role
of income distribution on tax evasion. I nd that when taxpayers are heterogeneous
in income, the response of individual evasion to a change in the marginal tax rate
depends upon relative income (income relative to the mean income). This implies
that the aggregate relationship between evasion and the marginal tax rate depends
on properties of the income distribution. I also analyze the impact of the structure
of the tax system on compliance, and show that raising the marginal tax rate of one
taxpayer type lowers the evasion of the remaining taxpayer types, the aggregate im-
pact being undetermined. I argue that this indeterminacy at the aggregate level may
help to explain the mixed empirical ndings on the relationship between tax rates
and compliance.
Earlier contributions by Cowell (1992) and Falkinger (1995) also examine the role
of exchange equity on tax compliance, but not in a reference-dependent framework.
Falkinger (1995) extends Cowell and Gordons (1988) model to allow concern for
a common equity index that is exogenous to the individual taxpayer, and reects
the overall equity of the economic order. By contrast, I develop a model with a
personalized notion of equity. Cowell (1992) also introduces a concern for equity, but
is unable to decisively overturn the perverse prediction of Cowell and Gordon (1988).
My approach also relates to a wider behavioralliterature on tax compliance. For
instance, research has considered the possible role in compliance behavior of stigma
or reputation costs (Gordon 1989; Kim 2003); and social norms (Myles and Naylor
1996; Traxler 1999). This literature, however, does not allow for the role of public
expenditure on compliance outcomes.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes a reference-dependent model of
tax compliance, and Section 3 explores its key comparative static properties. Section
4 explores two extensions of the model: allowing for heterogeneous taxpayers and
alternative ethical rules. Section 5 concludes.
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2 A Model of Tax Compliance
2.1 Government
My implementation of government is identical to that of Cowell and Gordon (1988).
There are n identical taxpayers, each with an exogenous taxable income of y, on
which the government levies a proportional income tax at marginal rate . Taxpayers
underdeclare their income by an amount denoted e, so the evaded tax is given by e.
Each year, a proportion p of all taxpayers are chosen at random for an income tax
audit at a cost of  [p] per person, where 0 [p] > 0. If audited, all current year tax
evasion is detected, and the taxpayer must pay an amount se, where s > 1. The
population is su¢ ciently large that government revenue is certain, and given by:
R = n (y    [p]  qe) > 0,
where q  1  ps is the expected rate of return to evading tax. The government uses
R to nance a publicly provided good (G). To allow for possible congestion e¤ects I
suppose:4
G  R
 [n]
,
where  is a function such that 1   [n]  n, and it is assumed that:
lim
n!1
1
 [n]
= 0; lim
n!1
n
 [n]
=
1
 
> 0.
Assuming a large economy (n!1) it follows that
G =
1
 
(y   qe   [p]) .
2.2 Taxpayers
Taxpayers are modelled as viewing outcomes in terms of gains and losses relative
to a reference level of net income (consumption). I therefore represent taxpayers
preferences with a valuefunction, V [], dened on changes in consumption about
an endogenous reference level of consumption cr. Consumption outcomes c  cr are
considered as gains, while outcomes c < cr are considered as losses. Individual
consumption is composed of the consumption of private goods and the public good.
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Following Bordignon (1993) I take a taxpayers per unit valuation of the public good
to be their marginal willingness to pay (m). An individuals valuation of the supply
of the public good is then mG. I can therefore write:
V [cp; G; cr] = V [cp +mG  cr] , (1)
where cp is a random variable representing the private component of consumption
(disposable income plus proceeds from evasion). It follows that, holding cr constant,
VG[cp;G;cr]
Vcp [cp;G;cr]
= m is the marginal willingness to pay for the public good.
The existing literature models m as a constant, which implies a zero income e¤ect.
My results also obtain if I assumem constant. It is perhaps more realistic, however, to
allow the marginal willingness to pay to be a function of the legal private consumption
level (the level of consumption if all legally due tax is paid), so thatm  m [y (1  )].
Higher incomes appear to be associated with more public services: Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973) nd that US general municipal expenditures show an income elas-
ticity of 0.64, while Borcherding and Deacon (1972) present evidence, again from the
US, that the income elasticities for various public services range between 0.2 and 1.0.
Accordingly, I suppose m0  0.
The specication of preferences in (1) assumes that taxpayers use a single reference
level against which to compare their combined consumption of public and private
goods. A possible alternative is that taxpayers make separate comparisons of their
consumption of public and private goods against two di¤erent reference levels, yielding
a specication of the form:
V [cp; G; crp; crG] = V [cp   crp;mG  crG] . (2)
It remains debated in the psychology literature as to whether decision-makers refer
simultaneously to multiple referents or, in order to simplify decision tasks, combine
aspects of several potential referents into a single composite referent (Copeland and
Cuccia 2002). For the purposes of this paper, however, the distinction appears of rela-
tively little importance for - as I comment further in Section 3 - the two specications
yield qualitatively similar results. As, however, the specication in (2) introduces
additional degrees of complexity into the analysis, I focus here on the simpler speci-
cation provided by (1).
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2.2.1 Reference Level
Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) suppose the reference level to be the legal consumption
level, by which I refer to the level of post-tax consumption if all legally due tax is
paid. Here legal consumption is given by the sum of legal disposable income and the
money value of the public good:
cl  y (1  ) +mG:
I propose a generalization that accommodates the concept of exchange equity. Having
paid their taxes, taxpayers look for good value from the government services provided
in return, and are sensitive to perceived adverse discrepancies between the value of
taxes paid and the value of the government services provided. In essence, taxpayers
think of taxes as being the pricepaid in return for the provision of public services.
I dene exchange equity for each taxpayer by comparing the value of taxes owed
(y) with the value of the public good provided (mG). Exchange inequity occurs if
y 6= mG, while exchange equity corresponds to the special case in which y = mG.
I assume the reference level of consumption corresponds to the level that is achieved
under exchange equity:
cr  cl + y  mG = y (3)
The intuition for (3) is that under exchange equity, the value of tax paid is exactly
o¤set by the value of the public goods provided in return, so the reference level
of consumption exactly matches private income. Note from (3) that under exchange
equity it holds that cr = cl, so in this instance any outcome involving some undetected
evasion is considered a gain. However, when y > mG it holds that cr > cl, so any
outcome that involves undetected evasion of less than (y  mG) will be perceived
as a loss, since the amount of evasion is still insu¢ cient to equalize the value of taxes
paid and public good provided. Undetected evasion must exceed (y  mG) for the
outcome to be perceived as a gain.
In principle, two forms of exchange inequity are possible. If y > mG the taxpayer
is said to experience unfavorable exchange inequity, but if y < mG the taxpayer
experiences favorable inequity. Evidence from attitudinal surveys suggests that the
case of perceived unfavorable exchange inequity is by far the more pervasive: while
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one can nd epochs in which governments have enjoyed widespread satisfaction with
their spending decisions5, most studies reveal pervasive beliefs across countries and
time that government is a wasteful bureaucracy which overtaxes the majority of its
citizens because of opportunities for tax avoidance for those with higher incomes and
wealth (Citrin 1979; Wallschutzky 1984). From a theoretical perspective this may
not be surprising: di¢ culties due to x-ine¢ ciency can thwart productive e¢ ciency
(Liebenstein 1966), while the problem of achieving allocative e¢ ciency for public good
provision is formidable. More generally, when taxpayers di¤er in their valuations of
each of the various types of public good, the allocation chosen by government will, in
general, be sub-optimal from the perspective of any individual taxpayer.6
In light of these arguments, I make the focus of the paper the case in which a degree
of perceived exchange inequity exists: y > mG. I assume an asymmetric notion of
exchange inequity, whereby taxpayers experience disutility from unfavorable inequity,
but are ambivalent towards favorable inequity. This assumption reects the idea that
people are less worked up by favorable inequity than by unfavorable inequity, which is
consistent with the emerging economic literature on inequity aversion (see e.g. Fehr
and Schmidt 1999) and the evidence in the Introduction.7 However, I discuss the
consequences of a symmetric notion of exchange equity in Section 4.2. Incorporating
this asymmetric notion of exchange inequity into the reference level of consumption
gives:
cr  cl + max [y  mG; 0] =

cl y  mG
y y > mG
. (4)
For the case of favorable exchange inequity (y  mG) I then have that cr = cl, in
which case the model collapses to a special case of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007). In
what remains, I devote my attention to the more interesting case in which y > mG.
2.3 Individual Maximization
Drawing on the insights of prospect theory I make the following assumptions on V []:
A0. V [c] is continuous for all c, twice di¤erentiable for c 6= 0, and V [0] = 0.
A1. V [c] is strictly increasing.
A2. V 0 [c] < V 0 [ c] for c > 0.
A3. V 00 [c] < 0 for c > 0 and V 00 [c] > 0 for c < 0.
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Assumptions A0 and A1 are standard technical assumptions, needed for tractability
and to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. Assumption A2 is loss aversion (the
disutility of a loss exceeds the utility of an equivalent gain), and assumption A3
is diminishing sensitivity (marginal utility is a decreasing function in distance from
the reference level). Diminishing sensitivity implies risk seeking preferences over
outcomes in the loss domain and risk averse preferences over outcomes in the gain
domain. Together, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity imply that V [] has a
kink-point at the reference level of consumption.
The overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities is
captured by the rank-dependent theory of Quiggin (1982), which applies a transfor-
mation to the cumulative probability distribution. For the pertinent case of a bi-
nary probability distribution, the probabilities (p; 1  p) are subjectively transformed
to (w [p] ; 1  w [p]), where w [p] is a continuous and strictly increasing probability
weighting function, with w [0] = 0 and w [1] = 1.8 It is worth noting, however, that
the paper does not require probability weighting: the results still hold if w [p] is taken
to be the identity function. The reason is that, although probability weighting is
potentially important in explaining the level of tax evasion, since w0 [p] > 0, it has no
qualitative implications for signing changes in tax evasion. In the special case when
taxpayerssubjective decision weights correspond to the objective probabilities, the
model di¤ers from expected utility theory only in respect of reference-dependence, and
therefore satises the axioms of Sugdens (2003) formulation of reference-dependent
subjective expected utility theory.
The taxpayers objective function can now be written as follows:
	  (1  w [p])V [cl + e  cr] + w [p]V [cl   (s  1) e  cr] .
When y > mG the reference level (4) is simply cr = y, so I can rewrite 	 as:
	 = (1  w [p])V [e  (y  mG)] + w [p]V [  (s  1) e  (y  mG)] . (5)
In Cournot fashion, the taxpayer chooses e, and hence e, to maximize 	 taking the
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average evasion of others (e) as given. This implies that G is replaced in (5) with:
G =
1
 
(y   qe   [p]) .
The rst-order condition with respect to e is then:
V 0 [Y ]
V 0 [Z]
=
w [p] (s  1)
1  w [p] , (6)
where, as throughout, the derivatives of V [] are dened for Y; Z 6= 0, and:
Y  e   y  m G ; Z  Y   se.
The second-order condition for an interior maximum requires that:
  (1  w [p])V 0 [Y ] fA [Y ] + (s  1)A [Z]g < 0, (7)
where A []   V 00[]
V 0[] is the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. The
assumption that the value function is convex for losses implies that there is no mean-
ingful restriction which ensures that (7) is satised. If (7) is not satised, then the
taxpayer chooses a corner solution at which they either declare all their income or
none of it. Although from a normative perspective these corner solutions cannot be
dismissed, from a positive standpoint it is clear that almost everyone pays at least
some fraction of their taxes, but often do not pay all their taxes. Therefore, I ar-
gue that interior solutions in which taxpayers evade some fraction of their taxes are
of greater interest from a positive perspective than either corner solution. In what
follows, I therefore focus my attention where the model is strongest from a positive
perspective: interior solutions that satisfy e 2 (0; y), which is the case if (7) is satised
and:
V 0

m G

V 0

m G  sy < w [p] (s  1)1  w [p] < 1. (8)
The second inequality implies q > 0, which is the standard restriction that the tax
gamble must have a positive expected return.
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2.4 Nash Equilibrium
The individual taxpayer chooses e treating e as exogenous. I now set e = e to solve
for the symmetric Nash equilibrium between taxpayers. The equilibrium expressions
for Y and Z are:
Y = e   y
 
(  m)  m
 
 [p] > 0; Z = Y   se < 0; (9)
where   1   mq
 
. The assumptions of an interior optimum, and of unfavorable
exchange inequity (y > mG), are su¢ cient to guarantee that these equilibrium
values of Y and Z satisfy Y > 0 and Z < 0. Therefore, by diminishing sensitivity, I
have that A [Y ] > 0 and A [Z] < 0. From (6) I have that:
@ (e)
@ (e)
=
(1  ) (A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  1)A [Z] > 0;
@2 (e)
(@ (e))2
= 0; (10)
so the reaction function of each taxpayer is a linear and increasing function of average
evasion e, which is su¢ cient to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium. Unlike
much of the behavioral literature on tax compliance cited in the Introduction, the
model therefore does not su¤er from the predictive di¢ culties associated with multiple
equilibria.9 I assume local stability of the Nash equilibrium, which requires that@(e)@(e)  < 1 (Cornes and Sandler 1986). Using the expression for @(e)@(e) in (10), local
stability can be shown to imply that A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] > 0.
3 Analysis
I begin by investigating the taxpayers optimal rate of taxation, which, for a given
level of evasion, balances the marginal benet from receipt of public goods with the
marginal cost of additional taxation. Using the equilibrium expressions for Y and Z
in (9) I have that:
@	
@

e=constant
=
y
 
(m    m0 G) f(1  w [p])V 0 [Y ] + w [p]V 0 [Z]g . (11)
Therefore, if m     m0 G > 0 (high m) individual utility is increasing in the tax
rate and the public good is said to be under-provided. If m      m0 G < 0 (low
m) individual utility is decreasing in the tax rate, and the public good is said to
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be over-provided. The individually optimal provision of the public good is therefore
when m    m0 G = 0.10
At the Nash equilibrium the response of evasion to a change in the tax rate is given
by:
@ (e)
@
=  
y
 
(m    m0 G) (A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] . (12)
Local stability guarantees that the denominator is positive, and as (A [Y ]  A [Z]) is
positive, it follows that (12) turns on the sign of   (m    m0 G). I therefore have
the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When the public good is over- (under-) provided, the e¤ect on tax
evasion of an increase in the tax rate is positive (negative):
@ (e)
@
? 0,   (m    m0 G) ? 0.
Proposition 1 is the opposite result to that of Cowell and Gordon (1988, 312). The
intuition behind the result is that when the public good is under-provided, increas-
ing the tax rate increases consumption, so the evasion required to at least achieve
exchange equity (beyond which taxpayers become risk averse over further evasion)
falls. Conversely, if the public good is over-provided, further increases in the tax rate
decrease consumption, so increasing the level of evasion required to achieve exchange
equity.
Similar to Proposition 1, Traxler (2009) also nds that the response of evasion to the
tax rate switches sign about a threshold. However, in Traxlers model the threshold
is in terms of a critical degree of internalization of the social norm for compliance,
and therefore does not correspond to the optimal provision of the public good as in
the present model.
In respect of the alternative specication of preferences in (2): if, for instance, additive
separability is assumed such that V [cp; G; crp; crG] = V [cp   crp]+V [mG  crG], with
crp = y (1  ) (the legal level of private consumption) and crG =  (y   e) (the value
of taxes paid), then an equivalent statement to that in Proposition 1 can be derived.
Turning to the role of income, I have that:
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@ (e)
@y
=  
1
 
f (m   ) + (1  )m0 Gg (A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] , (13)
which has the sign of  f (m   ) + (1  )m0 Gg. Consequently, when the public
good is under-provided (13) is negative, and remains so at the individual optimum.
However, for a su¢ cient degree of over-provision, i.e.  (m   ) <   (1  )m0 G,
the e¤ect on evasion of an increase in income becomes positive. In this latter case,
the prediction of (13) coincides with that of the standard portfolio model and the
empirical evidence (Clotfelter 1983; Baldry 1987).
I summarize the comparative static properties of the remaining variables in Proposi-
tion 2:
Proposition 2 For the rst-order condition given by (6) it holds that:
@ (e)
@ 
=
mG
 
(A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] > 0;
@ (e)
@ [p]
=
m
 
(A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] > 0;
@ (e)
@m
=   G (A [Y ]  A [Z])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] < 0;
@ (e)
@p
=  
mw0[p]
 
(se  0 [p]) (A [Y ]  A [Z]) + w0[p]
w[p](1 w[p])
A [Y ] + (s  )A [Z] ? 0, se 7 
0 [p] ;
@ (e)
@s
=  
mw[p]e
 
(A [Y ]  A [Z]) + eA [Z] + 1
s 1
(1  )A [Y ] + (s  1 + )A [Z] ? 0:
The rst three results of Proposition 2 are intuitive. The second result is obtained
(as  [p] is a function) by writing  [p] + " in (6) and computing lim"!0
@(e)
@"
. The
third derivative (with respect to m []) is computed analogously. However, as noted
by Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), under prospect theory there is ambiguity over the
response of evasion to both a change in the probability of detection (p) and the ne
rate (s). In the case of p, the derivative @(e)
@p
takes its expected negative sign if the
marginal increase in government revenue raised by increasing p (se) outweighs the
extra cost of raising p (0 [p]).
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The di¢ culty in signing the e¤ect of the ne rate arises from the assumption of
diminishing sensitivity (A3), as it implies that an increase in s leads the taxpayer to
wish to evade more in the loss state. Although there is no easily interpreted condition
under which @(e)
@s
takes its expected negative sign, the necessary condition for this
to occur does not appear unduly restrictive. For instance, if the value function takes
the constant-relative-risk-aversion form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
which the authors show to provide a good t to experimental data, it can be shown
that @(e)
@s
< 0.
The one issue so far ignored in the above analysis is the impact of loss aversion (A2),
which describes the phenomenon whereby the disutility of a loss exceeds the utility
of an equivalent gain. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) model loss aversion by writing
the value function in the form:
V [c; ] =

v [c] c  0
 v [ c] c < 0 ;
where  > 1 is an index of loss aversion. In the loss domain I therefore have that
@2V
@c@
= v0 [ c] > 0. Substituting V [Y ] = V [Y; ] and V [Z] = V [Z; ] in (6), I have
that:
@ (e)
@
=
w [p] (s  1) @2V
@c@
  (1  w [p])V 0 [Y; ] fA [Y; ] + (s  1)A [Z; ]g < 0;
where the result follows from the denominator being negative (by the assumption
of an interior maximum). The predicted negative e¤ect of loss aversion on evasion
agrees with the nding of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) in their model.
4 Extensions
4.1 Heterogeneous Taxpayers
I now relax the assumption of homogeneous taxpayers along the lines suggested in
Bordignon (1993). This enables, amongst other things, an investigation into the
role of the income distribution, and the structure of the tax system, in determining
tax compliance. In particular, I investigate whether taxpayers of di¤erent incomes
may respond di¤erently to a change in the tax rate, and how shifting the burden of
taxation between taxpayers a¤ects their compliance. Although an individual taxpayer
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is unlikely to know how much each other taxpayer in a large economy has evaded,
it might be reasonable to suppose that the individual knows the average evasion of
taxpayers within di¤erent classes of society. On this basis, let there be two types of
taxpayer, indexed i = 1; 2, where the number of each type is assumed to be n=2 for
simplicity.
4.1.1 Income Distribution and Compliance
I rst suppose that taxpayer types are distinguished by their income, yi i = 1; 2, but
remain otherwise identical. In this case I have that:
G =
1
 
(y   qe   [p]) ;
where:
e =
1
2
(e1 + e2) ; y =
1
2
(y1 + y2) .
The rst-order condition for an i-type taxpayer who takes e as given is then:
V 0 [Yi]
V 0 [Zi]
=
w [p] (s  1)
1  w [p] , (14)
where:
Yi = ei  
 
yi  mi G

; Zi = Yi   sei.
The second-order condition is analogous to (7). Local stability of the (unique) Nash
equilibrium here requires that @(e1)
@(e2)
@(e2)
@(e1)
< 1, which can be shown to imply that:
!iA [Yi] + (s  !i)A [Zi] > 0,
where !i  1   miq2 . Proceeding as in (11) I have that the public good is under-
(over-) provided from the perspective of an i-type taxpayer as miy    yi (1 +m0iG)
is greater than (less than) zero.
I now examine the e¤ect of a change in the tax rate on the equilibrium level of evasion.
Di¤erentiating the rst-order condition (14) yields:
@ (ei)
@
=  
1
 
fmiy    yi (1 +m0iG)g (A [Yi]  A [Zi])
!iA [Yi] + (s  !i)A [Zi] . (15)
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As the denominator of (15) is positive by local stability, it can therefore be seen that
- as was the case for homogenous taxpayers - individual evasion turns on the over-
or under-provision of the public good. Further insight is gained by noting from (15)
that:
@ (ei)
@
? 0, yi
y
? mi
 (1 +m0iG)
. (16)
Eqn. (16) demonstrates that the response of evasion to an increase in the tax rate de-
pends on a measure of relative income: the ratio of income to mean income. Although
@(ei)
@
may be of the same sign for both taxpayer types, it is possible that the two types
alter their evasion in opposite directions. This occurs when one type perceives the
public good to be under-provided while the other type perceives the public good to
be over-provided. In this case, the aggregate e¤ect on compliance depends upon how
income is distributed above and below the mean income level. Suppose that there is
a highincome type (i = 1) and a lowincome type, (i = 2), with y1 > y2. At this
level of generality it is not possible to determine which taxpayer type might increase
their evasion and which might lower it. However, if I follow the earlier literature in
making the simplifying assumption that m is constant (implying zero income e¤ects)
then (16) yields the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 If m is constant (zero income e¤ects) then in response to an increase
in the tax rate either:
i) Taxpayers of both types increase their tax evasion (if the public good is over-
provided) or decrease their tax evasion (if the public good is under-provided);
ii) Type-1 (high income) taxpayers increase their tax evasion and type-2 (low income)
taxpayers decrease their tax evasion.
Proposition 3 shows that if m0 is small enough, when the two taxpayer types respond
di¤erently, it is the high income taxpayers who increase their tax evasion, and the
low income taxpayers who decrease their evasion. The intuition for the result is that
high income taxpayers pay a greater amount of tax than low income taxpayers, yet
all taxpayers consume the same level of the public good. As such, if the valuation
of the public good is common across both taxpayer types, high income taxpayers are
the more likely to perceive the public good to be over-provided.
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The result paints a relatively complex picture for the aggregate level of evasion. If
both taxpayer types perceive the public good to be either under- or over-provided
then the aggregate impact is clear. However, if falling compliance by high income
taxpayers is o¤set by increased compliance by low income taxpayers then the ag-
gregate outcome cannot easily be determined, and depends critically on properties
of the income distribution such as the di¤erence in income between the two types
(y1   y2) and the abundance of high income taxpayers relative to low income. This
complexity over the aggregate impact may help to account for the mixed evidence
on the relationship between aggregate evasion and tax rates found in the empirical
literature.
The next case of interest is that of a pure increase in inequality, i.e. a mean preserving
spread of the income distribution. To implement the mean preserving spread I raise
y1 and lower y2 such that y is unchanged. The comparative static result is given by:
@ (e1)
@y1

y=constant
=
f   (1  )m01Gg (A [Y1]  A [Z1])
!1A [Y1] + (s  !1)A [Z1] . (17)
The rst term in the numerator reects a tendency to increase tax evasion due to
an increase in the tax liability for no change in public good supply. The second
term, however, reects the increased valuation of the public good from an increase
in income. In general, as these two e¤ects contradict, the net e¤ect in (17) can be of
either sign. However, ifm is assumed to be constant, I have the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 If m is constant (zero income e¤ects) then a mean preserving spread
of the income distribution that increases y1 and decreases y2 increases evasion by the
high income type:
@ (e1)
@y1

y=constant
> 0.
Proposition 4 shows that when m0 is small, a mean preserving shift of the income
distribution raises the evasion of the high income type. It is also straightforward
to show, as a corollary, that the mean preserving spread lowers the evasion of the
low income type. The high income taxpayers increase their evasion as a response
to the worsened exchange inequity entailed by the requirement to pay greater tax
for no increase in the supply of public goods. Conversely, the low income taxpayers
experience a lessening of exchange inequity, which induces a fall in evasion. While
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the standard portfolio model is consistent with this nding - it predicts that evasion
is an increasing function of income (Christiansen 1980) - it only does so under the
assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, which is not a feature of the current
model.
The opposing behavior of the two taxpayer types prevents the drawing of a clear
conclusion as to the aggregate compliance e¤ect. However, the Proposition suggests
that income inequality can generate disparity between the compliance of the rich and
the poor - a result consistent with a common nding from attitudinal surveys that
the rich are perceived as being the bigger evaders (Citrin 1979; Wallschutzky 1984).
4.1.2 Tax Rate Structure and Compliance
I now suppose that, in addition to the above analysis, each taxpayer type also faces a
di¤erent marginal rate of tax: i-type taxpayers pay tax at the marginal rate i. Kim
(2003) also allows for agents that are heterogenous in income and face an income-
dependent marginal rate of taxation. However, the author does not present any
results regarding parameter variations, instead focusing on the existence of multiple
equilibria. I begin by dening:
G =
1
 
 
y   qe   [p] ;
where:
e =
1
2
(1e1 + 2e2) ;  =
1
2
(1 + 2) :
The rst-order condition for an i-type taxpayer, taking e as given, is symbolically
identical to (14) with:
Yi = iei  
 
iy  mi G

; Zi = Yi   siei.
An interesting question to explore in this framework is the e¤ect of shifts in the burden
of taxation between taxpayer types on evasion. To do this I increase the tax burden
on j-type taxpayers relative to i-type taxpayers by allowing j to increase, holding
i constant. My result is summarized in the following Proposition (again assuming
local stability):
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Proposition 5 An increase in the marginal tax rate of one taxpayer type lowers the
level of evasion by the other taxpayer type:
@ (iei)
@j
=  
miy
2 
(A [Yi]  A [Zi])
iA [Yi] + (s  i)A [Zi]
< 0 i 6= j,
where i  1  miq2 

1 +
P2
j 6=i
@ej
@ei

. The intuition for Proposition 5 is that when the
tax payments of the one type of taxpayer increase, the associated increase in public
good supply moves the other taxpayer group closer to a position of exchange equity.
It follows that if I also allow i to fall to o¤set the increase in j (the case of a revenue
neutral redistribution of the tax burden) I obtain an even more signicant reduction
in evasion. The e¤ect of such a redistribution is simply to lower the tax owed by
i-type taxpayers without any o¤setting fall in public good provision.
Under progressive tax systems Proposition 5 implies that we should expect to observe
greater evasion by high income taxpayers relative to low income, as high income tax-
payers face higher marginal rates of tax. By highlighting the externalities between
the compliance behavior of the two taxpayer types, the Proposition also makes clear
that a concern for exchange equity engenders a similar interdependency in compliance
decisions to that of the social norm for compliance considered in Traxler (2009). As
such, the idea in Traxler (2009) that it is important to enforce high tax compliance
among taxpayers who are inuential to the compliance behavior of others also applies
in the current model. For instance, the model would predict that a campaign that
reduced evasion and avoidance of high income taxpayers (whose behavior seems emo-
tive to taxpayers more generally) would additionally lead to the improved compliance
of lower income taxpayers.
4.2 Ethical Rules
Until now I have considered an asymmetric notion of exchange equity in which tax-
payers are concerned about unfavorable exchange inequity but are ambivalent towards
favorable inequity. Bordignon (1993) proposes a stronger stance whereby taxpayers
never choose to evade beyond the point of exchange equity. Although he did not
do so, Bordignons approach can be motivated from the standpoint of a large socio-
psychological literature on equity theory (e.g. Homans 1958; Adams 1965). The
present model could be generalized in this direction by appropriate modication of
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the reference level. For instance, the reference level could be taken to be the legal
consumption level (cl), and it could be assumed that the proceeds of evasion are only
perceived as a gain if they reduce unfavorable exchange inequity, but not if they lead
to favorable inequity. Given the tendency of the standard portfolio model to overpre-
dict levels of tax evasion for plausible levels of risk aversion (Alm, McClelland, and
Schulze 1992), the most likely outcome of such a model would be for the taxpayer to
choose the constrained solution max [y  mG; 0]. That is, under favorable exchange
inequity the taxpayer would be fully compliant, but would evade up to the point of
exchange equity under unfavorable exchange inequity.
While this approach can explain the unwillingness of some experimental subjects to
evade any tax, even when the tax evasion gamble is clearly better than fair (Baldry
1986), equilibrium evasion is entirely mechanical, in the sense that it depends only on
(y  mG), so does not directly reect the preferences over risk and return embodied
in the utility function. An alternative approach that can explain this phenomenon
within my framework without such a consequence is to include stigma or reputation
costs in the payo¤s of the respective states (see e.g. Gordon 1989; Kim 2003).
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of tax evasion predicated on two important modications
of the standard portfolio model. First, I use a reference-dependent model of choice
under risk, the key feature of which is that taxpayers are risk seeking over outcomes
that fall below a reference level. Second, I model in the direction of the empirical
evidence by replacing the coercive relationship between taxpayer and government with
one of exchange whereby taxpayers care about inequity between the amount they pay
in taxes and the amount they perceive themselves to receive in public services.
I nd that evasion is increasing (decreasing) in the tax rate when the public good
is over- (under-) provided. This result, which accords well with intuition and exist-
ing empirical evidence, overturns the opposing result of Cowell and Gordon (1988).
Moreover, it is achieved without introducing perverse comparative static properties
for the remaining variables. In a more general setting, allowing for heterogeneous
agents, I nd that di¤erential responses of evasion to changes in the tax rate are
possible when agents di¤er in income. Moreover, whether individuals increase or de-
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crease their evasion in response to a change in the tax rate depends upon a measure
of their relative income. The aggregate e¤ect therefore depends on the properties of
the income distribution.
The ndings for heterogeneous agents, as well as the mixed empirical results on the
relationship between tax rates and compliance, suggest that more attention should be
placed, in both empirical and theoretical work, on the fact that trends in aggregate
evasion may well mask signicant heterogeneity between di¤erent types of taxpayers.
While this issue must await further exploration, I think the present exposition man-
ages to retain much of the tractability of the standard portfolio model while improving
its performance against the empirical evidence.
Notes
1See Feld and Frey (2007) for a review of the literature in this area.
2Specic evidence of reference-dependence in the context of taxation is provided
by Carroll (1992), who documents diaries of taxpayers tax-related thoughts and
behavior.
3In addition to tax compliance, prospect theory has also been applied to a wide
range of economic phenomena: examples include the endowment e¤ect (Knetsch
1989), the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995), and consumption
smoothing (Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin 1999).
4Allowing for congestion e¤ects implies that the publicly provided good is not a
public good in the technical sense of being perfectly non-rival and non-excludable.
I shall nevertheless refer to the publicly provided good as simply the public good
throughout.
5An example might be from the USA in the early 1960s, when less than fty
percent of Americans reported that they felt the tax burden was too high (Citrin
1979, 114).
6In extreme cases government can even spend a taxpayers contributions on goods
that may cause them disutility (e.g. nuclear weapons).
7Specically, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a utility function Ui [x; i; i],
where i weighs the disutility of unfavorable inequity and i weighs the disutility
of favorable inequity. The authors assume that i  i.
8Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also allow for di¤erent probability weighting func-
tions in the gain and loss domains. I apply a common weighting function as, empiri-
cally, the authors nd the same weighting function to hold in both domains.
9Equally, however, the model does not explain features of compliance that so
far appear to rely on the existence of multiple equilibria. Principally, this is the
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phenomenon of two countries experiencing very di¤erent levels of compliance despite
possessing similar compliance enforcement regimes (see e.g. Kim 2003; Traxler 2009).
10The Samuelson condition for Pareto optimality requires m =  , so the individ-
ual optimum is not Pareto optimal except in the zero-income e¤ect case (m0 = 0).
Gottlieb (1985) provides a more detailed analysis of Pareto optimality.
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